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I. INTRODUCTION
One outcome of the global financial crisis spurred by the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in the summer of 2007 was that it quieted the criticism surrounding the growth of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).1 In the
years preceding the crisis, Western politicians raised concerns that these
state-owned investment funds could be used, in effect, as political machines underwriting any number of state interests—from bankrolling
mercantilist industrial policies, to gaining access to natural resources,
critical infrastructure, and new technology.2 Unlike the ideal private investor, who is constrained by a profit motive, SWFs were not seen as
financial institutions pursuing purely commercial objectives and riskadjusted financial returns.3 Therefore, SWFs were viewed in a very different light when compared to other correspondingly large beneficiary
institutions, such as public pension funds.4 As creatures of the state,
SWFs were seen by some as a threat to liberal free-market capitalism
with the potential to undercut the functional efficiency of markets.5 The
*
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1. See generally Eric Langland, Misplaced Fears Put to Rest: Financial Crisis Reveals the
True Motives of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 263 (2009). For background
information on SWFs and definitional issues, see Ashby H. B. Monk, Recasting the Sovereign
Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance, 14 NEW POL. ECON. 451 (2009). For a
comprehensive legal treatment of international and bilateral regulation of SWFs, see FABIO BASSAN,
THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2011).
2. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1361–62
(2008).
3. See BASSAN, supra note 1, at 10–13.
4. See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 24–33, 48–58 (2010); Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds As
Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance
Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425, 436–50 (2009).
5. See generally Roland Beck & Michael Fidora, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on
Global Financial Markets, 43 INTERECONOMICS 349 (2008).

581

582

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:581

growing presence of SWFs—coinciding in particular with China’s rise to
prominence in the global economy and the general unease this created
for Western powers—was consequently an issue of national security,
both political and economic.6
This growing apprehension surrounding SWFs came to a head in
2006 with the Dubai Ports World (DP World) controversy. Even though
DP World—a state-owned infrastructure operator from the United Arab
Emirates—was not an SWF in form and function, the case provided a
potential opportunity for proponents of SWF investment, and foreign
investment in general, to overcome the criticism and skepticism.7 In
2006, DP World purchased U.K.-based ports operator Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), which had contracts to operate a number of U.S. ports, but did not own the ports themselves.8 Even
though the United States Committee on Foreign Investment authorized
the deal in 2005, several members of the U.S. Congress, namely New
York Senator Charles Schumer and Representative Peter T. King, raised
concerns about the national security implications of the deal.9 Because
DP World was a state-owned firm from the Middle East, DP World arguably fell victim to the “war on terrorism” political rhetoric and xenophobic mistrust. Not interested in the negative publicity and the prospect
of a congressional bill to impede the transaction, DP World divested
P&O’s U.S. ports operations.10
The financial crisis ultimately caused Western governments to welcome SWF investment as a way to put a floor under collapsing markets
and to provide a set of voluntary principles that would underwrite SWFs’
claim to legitimacy in the international community. In the autumn of
2007, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, in conjunction with
the International Monetary Fund, convened the International Working
Group of SWFs (IWG) to draft a set of generally accepted principles and

6. See EDWIN M. TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION? 40–45
(2010).
7. See Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment and the Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 42 INT’L LAW. 1231, 1243 (2008).
8. Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Shadow of Regulation and Politics, 40
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1207, 1229 (2009) [hereinafter Rose, Sovereign Wealth]; Paul Rose, Sovereigns As
Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 115 (2008) [hereinafter Rose, Sovereigns As Shareholders].
9. See David S. Cloud & David E. Sanger, Dubai Company Delays New Role at Six U.S. Ports,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/24/politics/24ports.html?pagewante
d=all&_r=0.
10. For a more detailed discussion on the DP World controversy, see generally supra note 8
and accompanying text.
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practices.11 These principles are referred to as the “Santiago Principles.”12 The implicit objective of these twenty-four voluntary principles
is to promote greater transparency and disclosure among the SWF community and mollify skepticism surrounding their commercial orientation.13 The Santiago Principles were designed to affirm the legitimacy of
SWFs and define the discourse surrounding their global expansion as
institutional investors in global capital markets in pursuit of risk-adjusted
financial returns.14 Ultimately, the development of the Santiago Principles was a means of defining SWFs—not as creatures of mercantilist realpolitik, but as benign pools of capital, like other conventional beneficiary institutions (e.g., supplementary occupational pension funds), contributing to the depth and efficiency of global financial markets.15
Taken together, the activities of SWFs do appear to be benign.
They may still be creatures of the state, but most appear to be chasing
risk-adjusted returns instead of keeping with the skeptics’ preconceived
notion of SWFs as political machines.16 This does not mean that SWFs
are not being used to further economic policy goals that are ultimately in
the interest of the state and national economy. For example, many SWFs
from the Gulf States are actively used to further industrial development
of their economies beyond natural resource extraction.17 Furthermore, the
activities of some countries, namely China, are still a cause for concern
in some quarters.18 But even in the case of China, it is not the actions of
11. INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 1, 7 (2008), available
at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
12. See id. at 1. The International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds was
established at a meeting of twenty-six countries with SWFs, including the United States, on April 30
to May 1, 2008, in Washington, D.C. Id. For more on the development of the Santiago Principles,
see generally Joseph J. Norton, The “Santiago Principles” and the International Forum of Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis
Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative Networking and Related “Soft”
Rulemaking?, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 465 (2010); Joseph J. Norton, The ‘Santiago Principles’
for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case Study on International Financial Standard-Setting Processes,
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 645 (2010) [hereinafter Norton, A Case Study].
13. See generally Ashby H. B. Monk, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust,
Legitimacy, and Governance, 14 NEW POL. ECON. 451 (2009).
14. See Norton, A Case Study, supra note 12, at 652.
15. See id.
16. See generally Jonathan Kirshner, Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Dog
that Will Refuse to Bark, 14 GEOPOLITICS 305 (2009).
17. See Daniel Haberly, Strategic Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment and the New Alliance
Capitalism: A Network Mapping Investigation, 43 ENV’T & PLAN. 1833 (2011); see generally ADAM
D. DIXON & ASHBY H. B. MONK, WHAT ROLE FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN AFRICA’S
DEVELOPMENT? (2011), available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Initiatives/Oil2Cash/Final_Formatte
d_Monk_and_Dixon_SWF_10.11.pdf.
18. See George Gilligan & Megan Bowman, State Capital: Global and Australian
Perspectives, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 597 (2014).
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the China Investment Corporation or its other sovereign funds, but rather
the international expansion of its state-owned enterprises that draws the
most skepticism.19 Notwithstanding the relatively benign conduct of
SWFs, the Santiago Principles have not, arguably, led to increased transparency. Compliance with the Santiago Principles has been slow and incomplete.20 This underlines the inherent political nature of SWFs, as they
reflect the norms and conventions of their sponsors in regard to transparency.21
Like any voluntary standard, compliance relies on the goodwill of
the organization, and ultimately, the organization’s sponsor. Compliance
is further complicated when there are varied interpretations as to the
standard requirements. What is needed, as I argue in the remainder of
this short essay, is an explicit treatment of transparency in its different
forms such that SWFs, their sponsors, and external analysts have a discursive device for evaluating and communicating when and why (and
why they think) certain nondisclosures are legitimate, or more importantly, when and why transparency in one domain may diminish the significance of disclosure in other areas, thus reducing the significance of nondisclosure in those areas. The aim, then, is to encourage dialogue, in conjunction with the Santiago Principles, on nondisclosure as doing so leads,
in my view, to increased transparency overall. Said slightly differently,
dialogue on nondisclosure is, in itself, a form of transparency.
II. ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY DIALOGUE
In previous work, I, along with Ashby Monk, considered a simple
conceptual framework to parse out different types of transparency in the
constitution and operation of sovereign funds. In that work, we distinguished five areas of sovereign fund transparency: (1) political; (2) procedural; (3) policy; (4) operational; and (5) performance.22 This concep19. See id.
20. See generally Sarah Bagnall & Edward M. Truman, IFSWF Report on Compliance With
the Santiago Principles: Admirable But Flawed Transparency, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (Aug.
2011), http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb11-14.pdf.
21. See generally GORDON L. CLARK ET AL., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: LEGITIMACY,
GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL POWER (2013); Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H. B. Monk, Rethinking the
Sovereign in Sovereign Wealth Funds, 37 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 104 (2012);
Kyle Hatton & Katharina Pistor, Maximizing Autonomy in the Shadow of Great Powers: The
Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2012).
22. See Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H. B. Monk, Reconciling Transparency and Long-Term
Investing Within Sovereign Funds, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INVESTMENT 275, 281 (2012), available
at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20430795.2012.703126. The conceptual framework
offered by Dixon and Monk is inspired by the framework developed for central bank transparency
offered by Petra Geraats. See Petra M. Geraats, Central Bank Transparency, 112 ECON. J. 532
(2002).
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tual framework mirrors many of the elements of the Santiago Principles.
As such, it can be seen as an extension of the Santiago Principles,
providing a somewhat different, and in some ways more explicit, language for exploring transparency and non-transparency.23
Our impetus for devising this conceptual framework was the
emerging concern that public disclosure among the SWF community
could potentially undermine long-term investment strategy. This concern
is based on the assumption that a long-term investment strategy is likely
to face increased criticism (primarily domestic) as a consequence of poor
short-term market performance during periods of market volatility. Put
simply, by disclosing performance metrics on a regular basis over the
short run, the investment focus of the fund would potentially become
concentrated on short-term performance to the detriment of higher longterm investment returns.24 But performance is just one area of transparency. Nondisclosure in this area may be perfectly acceptable for some
SWFs as a means of focusing the investment policy on the long term.
The problem, however, is when arguably legitimate nondisclosure extends, purposefully or not, into nondisclosure of another area that may be
deemed illegitimate.
The view taken here is that transparency is increased in the aggregate even if an SWF and its sponsor disclose only a rationale for maintaining nondisclosure in certain areas.25 And in those areas where nondisclosure is upheld, increased disclosure in other areas may provide
functionally equivalent information. The persistence of nondisclosure
among some (if not many) of the signatories of the Santiago Principles
suggests that there is no global consensus as to what constitutes transparency in relation to the operation of an SWF.26 Western countries and
multilateral organizations may attempt to coerce state sponsors of SWFs
(who are unaccustomed to transparency in the governance of state institutions) to become more transparent, but coercion may be resisted and

23. The Santiago Principles are divided into three sections: (1) legal framework, objectives,
and coordination with macroeconomic policies; (2) institutional framework and governance structure; and (3) investment and risk management framework. See Dixon & Monk, supra note 22, at
278. There are clear complementarities with the framework presented here, but the overlap and order
is not complete. Overlap is most clear in the first section, which complements political transparency.
24. See IFSWF Members’ Experiences in the Application of the Santiago Principles, INT’L
FORUM SOVERIGN WEALTH FUNDS, 34–37 (July 7, 2011), http://www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070 711.pdf.
25. Whether the framework here will work and by whom is an empirical question. Hence, the
claim here regarding workability is only hypothetical. For a discussion on the importance of analyzing the effectiveness and outcomes of transparency policies, see generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL.,
FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007).
26. See generally BAGNALL & TRUMAN, supra note 20.
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may ultimately be unsuccessful.27 Keep in mind, however, that with the
Kuwait Declaration of April 6, 2009, the IWG–SWF was succeeded by
the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), whose
purpose is to “meet, exchange views on issues of common interest, and
facilitate an understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF activities.”28 The Santiago Principles may have been written, but the dialogue
surrounding implementation continues. The issue of how SWFs are, or
can be, transparent is thus an ongoing discussion.
Table 1 (see below) provides a brief look at the objectives of each
form of transparency and the methods used. The following subsections
describe each area of transparency in more detail. Note that the treatment
of these areas of transparency and the potential methods used in this essay are not exhaustive. Hence, I am not providing a ranking system.29
The reason I have not chosen to rank funds or quantify transparency in
each category is that transparency is a social construction—there are
likely to be differing views as to what constitutes transparency and what
information must be disclosed in order for an organization to be considered transparent. Furthermore, it is not clear that a relative ranking of
SWF transparency will motivate increased transparency.30 Again, the aim
of the conceptual framework is to promote dialogue on the logic and rationale of nondisclosure, while also examining whether disclosure of certain information negates the significance of information not disclosed.

27. All SWFs face some form of accountability that results in disclosure. For example, fundamental to securities regulations in developed markets is the requirement that share ownership be
disclosed once a particular threshold (e.g., 10%) has been breached. For more on SWF accountability, see Anna Gelpern, Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum, 1
ASIAN J. INT’L L. 289 (2011). Gelpern maps four categories of demands on SWFs: public internal
accountability, private internal accountability, public external accountability, and private external
accountability. Id. at 295–307. The former two relate to domestic accountability issues, while the
latter two pertain to international and bilateral norms. See id. The aim of the categorization is to
understand whom an SWF answers to so that it is possible to determine to whom they should answer, while finding ways to resolve conflicts among an SWF’s constituencies. See Dixon & Monk,
supra note 21.
28. “Kuwait Declaration”: Establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, INT’L WORKING GRP. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.iwgswf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm. The IFSWF has met annually since its inception.
29. Like the index devised by Edward Truman. See EDWARD M. TRUMAN, A BLUEPRINT FOR
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND BEST PRACTICES (2008). There are important similarities between the
elements that comprise Truman’s index and the framework discussed here. Whereas Truman aims to
promote ideal “best practices,” that is not our aim. This is not to detract from the promotion of best
practices, as the framework here is ultimately about promoting more transparency. The difference is
that I do not begin from an a priori set of best practices. Rather, the approach taken here recognizes
the geopolitical reality that states will have varying views and interpretations regarding transparency.
30. For a criticism of the contemporary enthusiasm for transparency indexes, see David Heald,
Varieties of Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 23 (Christopher
Hood & David Heald eds., 2006).
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This may be unsatisfying for transparency advocates, but it is a geopolitical reality.31
Table 1: Framing Transparency

A. Political Transparency
Political transparency refers to the exogenous rules and regulations
underpinning the fund’s operations. The objectives here are twofold: On
the one hand, this form of transparency is about clarifying the objectives
of the SWF in relation to a policy goal or set of policy goals. Such goals
can range from saving for future generations to limiting the effects of
Dutch disease.32 The primary method of disclosure is a mission statement
31. See generally THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD (Ann Florini
ed., 2007).
32. “Dutch disease” is the coexistence within the traded goods sector of booming and lagging
subsectors. The booming sector is usually the extractive sector, which contributes to upward pressure on the value of the national currency on foreign exchange markets. The traded manufacturing
sector becomes less competitive on global markets as a consequence. The non-extractive sectors are
furthermore under pressure as a larger proportion of economic resources flow to the extractive sec-
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and a description of the legislative foundations of the fund. A clearly defined purpose is important, as it sets the basis for how an SWF should
operate as an investment institution. An organization charged with
providing a buffer fund in the event of fiscal distress should operate and
invest differently from a fund that is charged with facilitating local economic development or a fund that seeks to achieve at or above market
returns over the long-term. If an SWF appears to diverge from its specific policy objective, there may be cause for concern for those who are
skeptical of the SWF’s intentions.
Political transparency, on the other hand, is about clarifying the relationship vis-à-vis the SWF and the state sponsor. The method of disclosure here could be a description of the institutional arrangements (formal
or otherwise) guiding the interaction between the fund and the sponsor.
Examples of institutional arrangements include the frequency of reporting and ministerial or political representation on the board. Understanding these arrangements is very important for determining the intent of an
SWF. If, for example, a state sponsor proclaims the independence of an
SWF, yet the degrees of separation between political authority and dayto-day investment decision making appear small, a skeptical outsider
may have reason to suspect an underlying political motive that diverges
from the stated policy goals of the SWF. However, this does not mean
that in the case where an SWF is independent from the state sponsor that
the state sponsor should be absent from setting broader investment goals
or ensuring that the SWF abides by its mandate.
B. Procedural Transparency
Procedural transparency refers to how decisions are made, and by
whom, throughout the process of achieving an SWF’s intended mission
and policy goals. The objective here is to clarify the governance architecture and the investment decision-making process. Disclosure includes
information on how the board is chosen, arrangements regarding board
tenure, and how authority is delegated inside and outside of the fund—
such as to the designation to an investment committee, the selection of
external managers, or the hiring of internal staff. Understanding how the
leadership of the fund is chosen and how authority is delegated provides

tor. Consequently, economic growth and development is asymmetric, which may be detrimental to
the economy and society over the medium and long runs, as natural resources are extinguished or as
prices collapse. Economies, in effect, become dependent on the extractive sector for growth and
welfare. See generally W. M. Corden, Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and
Consolidation, 36 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 359 (1984) (U.K.); W. Max Corden & J. Peter Neary,
Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy, 92 ECON. J. 825 (1982) (Gr.
Brit).
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crucial insight into the intended behavior of the SWF. If, for example,
board selection is purely a political exercise where board members are
selected based on political relationships and not domain-specific expertise, it is difficult for the state sponsor and the SWF to claim independence from political meddling, even if such interference is nonexistent.
Again, this does not mean that state representatives cannot be members
of the board; however, if a board lacks members with independent authority and domain-specific expertise, the skeptical outsider may be more
likely to infer that the SWF has political intentions.
Likewise, where assets are not managed in-house, disclosing how
the SWF selects external managers provides valuable information. The
delegation of external mandates through a competitive and transparent
bid process goes a long way in revealing whether an SWF has political or
purely financial motivations. This logic holds equally where in-house
management is preferred. A board and a sponsor concerned with limiting
any semblance of political meddling would likely grant significant independence to internal asset managers and investment committees in the
day-to-day operation of the SWF and the selection of specific investments.
C. Policy Transparency
Policy transparency refers to the rules and objectives that the fund
imposes on its own operations and personnel in implementing investments. The objective of this form of transparency is to provide clarification regarding an SWF’s investment beliefs and guiding principles.33
Knowledge regarding investment beliefs provides valuable information
on an SWF’s intent. If a statement of investment beliefs is grounded in
Modern Portfolio Theory34 and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis,35
which would suggest that the SWF follows a passive investment strate-

33. There is a growing interest in defining and disclosing investment beliefs among some of
the largest public and multiemployer pension funds. For discussions, see generally KEES KOEDIJK &
ALFRED SLAGER, INVESTMENT BELIEFS: A POSITIVE APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING
(2011) (U.K.); KEITH P. AMBACHTSHEER, PENSION REVOLUTION: A SOLUTION TO THE PENSIONS
CRISIS (2007).
34. MPT is theory of asset allocation whereby it is possible to maximize the expected return of
the portfolio given a certain amount of portfolio risk. The aim is to select a set of assets that collectively has a lower level of risk than any individual asset. See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio
Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
35. According to EMH, financial markets are informationally efficient. Consequently, it is
impossible to consistently achieve risk-adjusted returns in excess of the market. See generally
Eugune F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970).
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gy36 and holds a diversified portfolio, but the SWF is seen to be making
large investments in a small selection of firms, skeptics are likely to see
reasons for concern. But, if an SWF’s investment beliefs go against convention, preferring instead smaller and more targeted investments that
can be monitored more easily, the SWF’s behavior would not be out of
the ordinary.
For an SWF and sponsor not accustomed to complete transparency,
a detailed set of investment beliefs—one that provides information on
how the SWF views investment opportunities and the SWF’s geographic
distribution—provides an external analyst important information that can
be cross-referenced with other available information. For example, if
information regarding investments is revealed that diverges from the
stated investment beliefs, some may assume that the SWF has alternative
intentions as an SWF is unlikely to keep evidence of a large deal undisclosed indefinitely.
In this area of transparency, an SWF may also provide information
regarding the circumstances under which the SWF will engage its investment entities. Some SWFs may view corporate engagement as best
left to others, choosing instead to simply exit the investment. This is the
most likely case for SWFs concerned with the political ramifications of
corporate engagement (particularly of foreign firms), as it could easily be
labeled as political intervention by a foreign government. For other
SWFs, particularly those that can demonstrate the extent of the SWF’s
independence from direct political influence, corporate engagement may
be a crucial part of its investment beliefs.37 An argument can be made
that ownership entails certain rights and responsibilities. Exercising
voice instead of exit may be more preferable for the long-term institutional investor.38
36. In contrast to active management where investors try to beat the market through stock
selection, the passive investor focuses on achieving risk-adjusted market returns at the lowest possible costs, usually by constructing a portfolio that tracks an externally specified index (e.g., S&P
500). See generally JOHN Y. CAMPBELL & LUIS M. VICEIRA, STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION:
PORTFOLIO CHOICE FOR LONG-TERM INVESTORS (2002).
37. For example, Norges Bank Investment Management, the organization charged with managing Norway’s SWF Government Pension Fund-Global, has begun to increasingly engage the leadership of the companies it invests in. This is seen as one of its long-term fiduciary responsibilities,
given that on average it owns 2.5% of the companies in which it invests. See Richard Milne, Norway
Wealth Fund Focuses On Corporate Engagement, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013.
38. See generally STEPHEN DAVIS ET AL., THE NEW CAPITALISTS: HOW CITIZEN INVESTORS
ARE RESHAPING THE CORPORATE AGENDA (2006); TESSA HEBB, NO SMALL CHANGE: PENSION
FUNDS AND CORPORATE ENGAGEMENT (2008); Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Pension Fund Corporate Engagement: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 59 REL. INDUSTRIELLES/INDUS. REL. 142 (2004)
(Can.); see also JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM
DECISION-MAKING (2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/1
2-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf.
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D. Operational Transparency
Operational transparency refers to the way the investment strategy,
underpinned by investment beliefs, is implemented and by whom. The
objective here is to describe the ways in which the fund seeks to put policies into action, such as how the fund plans to access financial markets,
certain industries, and geographies. The most transparent method for disclosure is regular and detailed provision of information on asset allocation, specific investments, and intended holding periods. Ultimately, operational transparency is about clarifying what an SWF is actually doing.
For some SWFs, provision of such details may not be forthcoming. For
others, it may be forthcoming, but not on a regular basis for fear of undermining a particular investment or investment strategy.39 This may,
however, foster skepticism. Although not a perfect substitute, an SWF
may instead provide detailed information about the managers that have
been selected, the scope of their investment mandates, and the ongoing
monitoring of these investment relationships. It may also provide information on how internal teams have been constructed. This can be seen as
providing somewhat of a proxy for asset allocation. Finally, where an
SWF participates in corporate engagement, operational transparency entails disclosure of such actions and the reasons for those actions, if that
action has not already been publicized, as is likely to be the case.
E. Performance Transparency
Performance transparency refers to the investment outcomes
achieved by the fund. The objective of this form of transparency is to
shed light on whether an SWF is performing as designed, but more importantly, whether it is in keeping with its mission. While poor performance may point to an ineffective, inexperienced, and ill-resourced organization (among other potential problems), it may also point to investments made for political purposes or an organization that is subject
to excessive political interference in its day-to-day operations.40 Performance-exceeding market returns may also be an indicator of impropriety.
However, an SWF that discloses a best-practice governance architecture,
its investment beliefs, procedures for monitoring investment relationships, and how it maintains and motivates an expert staff, among other
areas of disclosure discussed above, can more easily justify above average performance.
39. For example, if an SWF indicated its intended holding period for specific investments,
other investors in the market may trade on that information and therefore undermine the SWF’s
expected returns from the investment.
40. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799–839 (1993).
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The most obvious method for disclosing performance is providing
information on returns set against some market benchmark, or absolute
returns. The issue, however, is the frequency of such disclosure. For
long-term investors, monthly and quarterly returns may seem inappropriate. Markets can be highly volatile in the short run, which can exaggerate
good or bad performance. For an SWF trying to maintain a long-term
investment strategy, poor performance in the short run, while possibly
pointing to an ill-resourced and ill-managed organization, may give the
organization’s sponsors or its detractors reason to intervene in the SWF’s
operations. Such intervention may jeopardize the long-term strategy, or
the threat of potential intervention could force the organization to have
an overly short-term focus.
For a number of commentators, SWF officials, and SWF sponsors,
the demand for short-term performance metrics is arguably the cause of
so much short-termism in financial markets.41 Hence, many SWFs
choose not to produce performance metrics on a regular basis, if they
produce them at all. For example, since 2010, the Singapore Government
Investment Corporation has disclosed its real returns on five-year, tenyear, and twenty-year bases while producing increased information on its
governance, investment policies, and operations.42 This contrasts with the
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF), which produces monthly
performance metrics.43 The NZSF combines this regular disclosure with
active public engagement, going to great lengths to educate the public on
how markets, particularly equity markets, are volatile in the short run, yet
mean reverting over the long run.44
The case of the NZSF is compelling as it demonstrates that producing quantitative performance metrics is insufficient as a whole; an organization needs to provide further justification of its performance as a

41. For a general discussion on short-termism, see generally David Marginson & Laurie
McAulay, Exploring the Debate on Short-Termism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 29
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 273 (2008); Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance
Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65 (2005).
42. See GOV’T OF SING. INV. CORP. PTE LTD, GIC REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT’S PORTFOLIO FOR THE YEAR 2010/11, at 8 (2011), available at http://www.gic.com.s
g/images/pdf/GIC_Report_2011.pdf.
43. See generally N.Z. SUPERANNUATION FUND, HOW WE INVEST (2012), available at
http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/files/How%20We%20Invest.pdf.
44. See Dixon & Monk, supra note 22. For more detailed accounts of Singapore’s sovereign
wealth funds, see generally CLARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 86–104; Henry Wai-chung Yeung,
From National Development to Economic Diplomacy? Governing Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth
Funds, 24 PAC. REV. 625 (2011). For further discussion on the governance of the New Zealand
Superannuation Fund, see Benjamin J. Richardson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Quest for
Sustainability: Insights from Norway and New Zealand, NORDIC J. COM. L, 2/2011 at 1,
http://www.njcl.utu.fi/2_2011/benjamin_j_richardson.pdf (Fin.).
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means of ensuring its legitimacy with the public.45 Hence, other methods
of performance disclosure can come through internal and external audits
that may examine subjective criteria. These subjective reports could examine, for example, whether there is a self-reflexive learning culture
within the organization and the board. Producing such performance reports is ultimately about reflecting the image of a professional financial
institution, which is focused on achieving some risk-adjusted return in
the pursuit of a legitimate policy goal established by the sponsor.
III. CONCLUSION
Often underlying Western society’s concern with the rise of SWFs,
or for that matter, any accumulation of financial power by some public
entity (e.g., a public-employee pension fund or a state-owned enterprise),
is the intrinsic link these entities have with the state. There is a perception that this link is incompatible with free-market capitalism. If not always an explicit argument, skeptics fear that such state-sponsored entities, even if there is a high degree of organizational and political separation from the decision makers of these entities, will ultimately contravene “free” market process of exchange to the benefit of the political
will. In a space that purportedly should be limited to only private actors,
this interference is ultimately inefficient. By this logic, such entities contravene the “spirit of capitalism” and are thus seen as threatening.
Unfortunately, skeptics seem to forget or ignore that markets are
inherently political: Throughout the history of capitalism and over the
last 150 years, the state has had a key role in ensuring capitalist processes—whether explicitly or implicitly.46 The state sets many of the “rules
of the game” through regulation and is usually there to provide public
goods to the economy that are necessary for the rest of the capitalist system to operate. No successful developed market economy is without a
relatively strong state and strong institutions.47 The global financial crisis
of the last decade reminded us that even in the most so-called free markets, the state is always waiting in the shadows to rescue capitalism from
its excesses and failures. The state is likely to continue to do so, even to
the chagrin of free-market purists, because it has always done so. Most

45. See generally Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571 (1995).
46. See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, HISTORICAL CAPITALISM (1983).
47. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).
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political leaders are unwilling to sit back and see what happens if action
is not taken, even if the moral hazard is clear.48
Following the global financial collapse in September 2008, it was
not uncommon to hear fearful pronouncements that capitalism could
soon be replaced—that emerging markets that had embraced capitalism
as a means to organize their economies over the last several decades
would revert to their old ways. The specter of socialism was knocking on
the door, or was it? Like most crises, many forget to remind themselves
that capitalism has always oscillated between booms and busts (to varying degrees). However, this fear was not so much a fear of a return to
socialism, but a fear of a return of the interventionist state and a state that
controls the means of production.49 Yet, if one is reminded that the state
is a part of the process, even in the freest of markets, then a more visible
state is not necessarily counterproductive to a properly functioning free
market, or the continuing existence of one. The state may have to periodically show its face, but it is still firmly on the side of capitalism in almost all countries. That the majority of SWFs are in emerging markets is
not just a product of global imbalances and high commodity prices over
the last decade—it demonstrates the way that market capitalism has been
embraced since the end of colonial rule and the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Since the crisis began, more and more countries have established or
are in the process of establishing their own sovereign wealth funds.50
Given that SWFs are by nature capitalist entities in pursuit of the profits
of global capitalism, this development is further confirmation of market
capitalism as a form of economic organization with states (not surprisingly) as leading supporters.
But, states are not all the same. States and their polities do not always share the same values or have the same political traditions—
openness and transparency included. This is not, however, a state of affairs that is unchangeable. Economic and political globalization brings
ideas and different traditions into contact, often engendering change in
the process. Hence, sponsors of SWFs may not all agree on what constitutes transparency. This is clearly apparent given the arguably measured
compliance with the Santiago Principles. Nonetheless, the appetite for
and commitment to dialogue on transparency and other general issues
related to sponsoring an SWF, fostered through the IFSWF, is clearly
48. Consider the massive bailout programs in advanced economies implemented in the midst of
the financial crisis of 2008. See generally EMILIANO GROSSMAN & CORNELIA WOLL, SAVING THE
BANKS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BAILOUTS (2013).
49. See generally IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR
BETWEEN STATES AND CORPORATIONS? (2010); Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 7 J. MGMT. RES. 119 (2007).
50. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 1–12.
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palpable. While not seeking to replace the Santiago Principles, the simple
conceptual framework offered in this essay is a response and contribution
to that commitment.
Assuming that some SWFs and their state sponsors will remain
wedded to nondisclosure in certain areas, it does not mean that they will
necessarily maintain nondisclosure in other areas, which may provide a
partial substitute for certain nondisclosures. Complete transparency may
be wanting for some, but in the aggregate, transparency is increased if
dialogue on non-transparency and potential functional equivalencies is
expanded. Again, the framework provided here is for discursive purposes, which may be used by SWFs, their sponsors, and external analysts in
describing the intentions of an SWF and ultimately those of the sponsor.

